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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we analyse the implications for the Mexican financial system of substituting 
the Pay as you go pension system by a private Fully Funded scheme. With that aim, we 
begin by applying the Standard ADF test, in order to test each variable for the presence of 
a unit root relation. This test are required to validate the use of the cointegration 
technique of the Engle-Granger two-steps cointegration methodology, which has the 
advantage of distinguish a long-term OLS regression and an Error Correction Model for 
the short-term dynamics. We found that higher pension assets are associated in the long-
run with financial savings, which is consistent with the fact that pension fund may act as 
a institutional investors managing the increased personal savings. With respect to the 
banking industry, a negative long-run relationship was found. This negative sign can be 
explained by the declining trend on the credit provided from commercial banks to the 
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 1 Introduction 
 
One of the consequences of the increased longevity of world population, 
caused by the rise in life expectancy and the decline in the fertility rate, is the 
financial collapse of many pension systems.
1 Growing benefits and rising 
dependency ratios have made most of the existing pension systems 
unsustainable. As a result of this global ageing process, retirement schemes 
have become ineffective for providing adequate old-age saving, insurance 
and to make appropriate distributions.  
 
The existing pension systems were originally created on the basis that there 
were enough participants in the next generations to support current 
participants, (a pyramidal scheme). These pension systems pay “defined 
benefits”, which are defined according to a formula based on the worker’s 
earnings and years of service and are financed by payroll taxes on a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) scheme.  Under this system the government, acting as trusted 
agent, collects funds from current workers and allocates them to current 
retirees.  
 
The survival of this scheme, in a context of increased longevity, requires 
governments to take drastic measures. In other words, for the existing system 
to provide the same benefits as before, taxes must increase drastically or else 
governments will run large unsustainable deficits. Less drastic measures have 
also been suggested to tackle with this problem. Those measures include 
increases in the retirement age and raising the current contribution made by 
workers
2. Unfortunately, as a result of the current fall in fertility rates, these 




In light of this, a structural reform of the pension system can be seen as the 
way the governments found to attacking the aging population problem. As a 
result pension reforms have been taking place in many countries around the 
globe, from Latin America to OECD countries and many developing countries 
in Europe and Asia
3.  
 
More often than not, this reform implies the change from an (unfunded) PAYG 
state run system to a “defined contribution” Fully-Funded (FF) private scheme. 
A “defined contribution” FF scheme has a self-insurance basis, which involves 
people saving for their retirement, with the money being deposited in 
individual accounts. These are privately managed accounts that require a 
mandatory monthly deposit, whilst allowing for voluntary deposits if the holder 
of the account is interested.  
                                                 
1 According to UN Figures, the number of persons aged 60 years or over around the world is 
expected to triple by 2050; in contrast, the number of children (0-14 years) will change little 
over the next 45 years, their share of the total population will drop from 28% to 20%. In 
addition, by 2050, most of the aged population will live in the developing world. 
2 Chile, Germany and Japan increased their statutory retirement age from 65 to 67 years. 
3 For a complete summary of pension systems and reform dates across the world, see Hu 
(2005). 
  2 
Most people believe that the shift from a PAYG system to a private FF 
scheme would increase economic welfare of the population, through rises in 
efficiency. Privately managed pension plans are likely to be invested in a 
mixture of public and corporate bonds, and managed wisely, producing a 
better allocation of resources with higher rates of return, as a consequence.   
 
In this sense, it has been said that one of the advantages of this reform, is 
that it spurs financial market development, by creating a demand for new 
financial instruments and institutions.  
 
In the case of Mexico, this structural reform took place in 1997.
4 The new 
system replaced the old one by a defined contribution scheme. In the new 
system, workers are free to choose pension fund management companies, 
known as AFOREs, to administer their accounts. Up to 2004, there were 
almost 34 million accounts AFOREs. The retirement savings have evolved 
from 191 billion pesos in 1998 (4% of GDP) to 804 billion pesos in 2004, 
which represents almost 11% of GDP. 
 
In this paper we analyse the implications for the Mexican financial system of 
substituting the PAYG pension system by a private FF scheme. With that aim, 
we begin by applying the Standard ADF test, in order to test each variable for 
the presence of a unit root relation. This test are required to validate the use 
of the cointegration technique of the Engle-Granger two-steps cointegration 
methodology, which has the advantage of distinguish a long-term OLS 
regression and an Error Correction Model for the short-term dynamics. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Part 2 contains a brief 
description of PAYG and FF schemes and the pension reform features. Part 3 
Reviews the pension reform features for the Mexican case. Part 4 presents an 
econometric estimation of the macroeconomic effects of the switch, part 5 
concludes.  
 
2  The systems and the reform 
2.1 The  systems 
2.1.1  Economics of the systems 
 
Samuelson’s (1958) two-period Overlapping Generations Model (OLG) is the 
precursor of the literature on social security. In this model, people are 
assumed to work in year t and retire in year t+1 and for simplicity, the model 




                                                 
4 A first attempt of a structural reform was held in 1992, creating the Retirement Savings 
System as a complementary scheme to the existing PAYG system.  The attempt however, 
had some limitations which will be commented later in this paper. 
  3A simplified version of the social security modelling in a two periods OGM is 
as follows: 
 
In this economy, individuals are assumed to born at time  t  and consume 
when young and  at time t+1. The lifetime utility for an individual is:  t c1 1 2 + t c
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There is a wage rate  that individuals get when young. It is assumed that 
there are no bequests in the economy, so that only the young individuals save 
at period t, this saving generate a capital stock in t+1 that is used with the 
young persons wage at t+1 to produce output. 
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In this economy,    are the individuals born at time t, and the population 
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With these elements, the problem for the individual is: 
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An increase in the wage rate increases consumption in both periods. 
Assuming that the substitution effect dominates an increase in interest rates 
make people save more since the opportunity cost of current consumption is 
higher.   
 
With social security, individuals pay a contribution   when young and receive 
a pension or benefit of   when old. 
t d
1 + t b
 
Under a PAYG program, the contributions of the young in period t are 
transferred directly to the current old at time t: 
1 ) 1 ( − + = t t t d n d b  
  4Under this scheme, the implicit steady state return on social security 
contributions is the rate of population growth, n. It can be said that 1+n young 
are needed to sustain the benefits of one old
5. 
 
In a fully funded system on the other hand, the contributions of the young are 
invested and returned with interest next period.  
1 ) 1 ( − + = t t t d r b  
The return on social security contributions is .  t r
 
In the PAYG context, a decline in  (due to a decline in fertility rate or a 
reduction in mortality, such that ageing increase) reduces the benefits 
received by the old. Therefore, if social security benefits   are to remain the 
same as before, contributions  must increase. 
t n
) ( t b
) ( t d
 
In other words, the Samuelson’s OLG model showed that a PAYG scheme 
without capital and technical progress generates an implicit rate of return on 
each generation taxes’, which equals the rate of growth of population. This 
happens because the number of taxpayers is larger than the number of 
retirees by the rate of growth of population. 
 
In this context, PAYG schemes, as Samuelson noted, could raise welfare in 
an economy that has no capital assets. However, in an economy with capital 
assets, the reduction in the rate of saving caused by the provision of PAYG 
annuities can cause a reduction in the present value of all current and future 
consumption. 
 
Only in the situation where PAYG scheme is mature, population growth is 
constant and PAYG is financially balanced, are pensioners paid, on average, 
a real rate of return equal to real wage of return in the economy. However, 
this two differ under a PAYG systems not only because the growth rate of the 
wage bill is typically lower than the real return on capital, but also because  of 
the recent trend observed in g (growth of wages) and n (population rate) for 
most economies  
 
2.1.2  PAYG features  
 
A PAYG scheme is a contract of mandatory transfers from workers to 
pensioners. These transfers are backed by an implicit debt or a promise to 
contribution workers cohorts that they will benefit from future worker 
contributions once they retire. 
 
In this kind of scheme, contributions made by today’s workers, are used to 
pay the pension of the retired, so that what current pensioners receive is the 
funds paid by current workers in the form of payroll tax, rather than the 
                                                 
5 If we introduce wages explicitly, the implicit rate of return is ( )( ) 11 ng + +  where g is the 
wage increase rate. 
  5revenues collected by the government from pensioners when they were 
working. 
 
The main advantage of PAYG over FF systems is the inflation risk they are 
able to cover, as they are financed by taxing current working population while 
the funded schemes use accumulated assets to pay out pensioners. In this 
sense, only the State can guarantee indexed amounts of pension.  
 
On the other hand, PAYG introduces several market distortions, mainly in the 
labour market, which leads to reductions in both output and welfare levels. 
These distortions are basically in two areas: labour force participation and the 
composition of formal and informal employment and unemployment.  
 
Regarding the former, it can be said that under PAYG, working population is 
taxed to pay current retirees, and this induces workers to retire earlier, or 
reduce hours worked. Early retirement increases the annual cost of social 
security benefits and reduces the available labour income tax base, which 
implies higher marginal rate of social security tax and increases the source of 
deadweight loss. In this sense it is fair to say that the PAYG distorts not only 
the number of hours worked but also occupational choice, effort and location.  
The, PAYG system also imposes an implicit tax wedge between the cost of 
labour to firms and the sum of the wage and the expected future pension 
benefits by the worker. The size of implicit PAYG tax on labour grows with the 
difference between the market interest rate and the expected rate of return of 
PAYG.  
 
With respect to the composition of employment, under PAYG, employers are 
more likely to substitute capital for labour, giving rise to increase in 
unemployment rate or switching production to labour intensive countries. 
PAYG systems tend to raise gross labour costs in formal markets, thus 
expanding the informal sector, while depressing real net wages (this distortion 
is avoided by a FF). Unfortunately the informal sector suffers of at least two 




In Latin America countries, the decrease in benefits paid under a PAYG 
system involves more than pure economic reasons. These countries allowed 
different pension schemes for different production sectors and group of 
workers. Moreover, the high macroeconomic instability resulted in frequent 
adjustments of contributions and benefits, by governments for fiscal purposes; 
while high and unstable inflation lead to major changes so that evasion of 
pension contributions leads to low coverage
7. 
                                                 
6 Schmidt-Hebbel (1997) found that workers in Chile move from the informal to formal sector 
in response to the regime swithcing i.e. labour supply in formal sector remains at a lower level 
under PAYG schemes. 
7 Some other problems in the case of Latin America countries involve the rising deficits 
spilling into fiscal balances or leading to increasing payroll taxes as well as labour market 
distortions and informalization. Lack of efficient management of old pension systems lead to 
perverse redistribution toward powerful interest groups while old age poor were insufficiently 
protected. An additional problem of Latin American economies was their underdeveloped 
capital markets.  
  6 
In this sense, Latin America pension reform is part of a development strategy 
based on decentralization of economic decisions to private agents. The Latin 
America countries that have successfully implemented a reform in their 
pension systems are: Chile (1981), Peru (1993), Argentina and Colombia 
(1994), Uruguay (1996), Bolivia and Mexico (1997), El Salvador (1998), Costa 
Rica (2001) and Dominican Republic (2003). 
2.1.3 FF  features 
 
FF system is based on contributions to individual accounts in pension funds 
that are invested in financial markets and managed by pension-fund 
management companies (PFMCs) during workers active life and by insurance 
companies (ICs) during retirement. 
 
In contrast to PAYG schemes, a FF scheme forces workers to save part of 
their working age income for retirement age. For the design of the scheme, 
the average return depends on market interests and rates of return.  
 
With a FF system, inter-generational transfer is eliminated and people receive 
what they contributed, plus accumulated profits; the linkage between 
contributions and benefits is strengthened while the increase in payroll taxes 
and decrease in replacement rate are avoided. These features of the FF 
systems are the reason why it has been said that funded systems are 
beneficial to the development of capital markets
8.  
 
Another advantage of a FF scheme is that savings are collected in Personal 
Retirement Accounts (PRA) so that there is little way to give the politicians the 
opportunity to redistribute funds toward favoured groups. These accounts are 
privately managed to avoid political corruption. To achieve a higher real rate 
of return, funds are completely managed by asset managers following 
maximization principles. In this sense, funding pension reforms can have a 
positive impact on financial market development as the function of financial 
markets is improved. 
 
The levels of the contributions to the FF scheme are mandatory and in some 
countries, limited tax incentives to additional voluntary contributions are 
implemented. It is often argued that participation in a pension scheme has to 
be mandatory because people are short-sighted to provide for their own 
retirement. This has been known as the “myopia reason”, it is argued that in 
the absence of mandatory participation, some individuals would make no 
provisions for their own retirement, as they might believe that the government 
would not allow them to live in poverty when old, so that they save little, if 
anything, when young
9. In other words, if contributors perceive that they are 
                                                 
8 In a Latin America case, there is evidence linking Chile’s 23-year experience with growing 
financial system. 
9 Diamond (1977) found that in the absence of social security, a substantial fraction of the 
population would end up with insufficient amounts of wealth for their post-retirement period.  
 
  7entitled to secure benefits when retired, they reduce discretionary saving 
accordingly. 
 
In summary, there are two clear benefits of mandatory FF in comparison to 
mandatory PAYG: The former could make people more aware of the need to 
save for retirement (reducing the extent of myopia), the other is the 
contribution of FF to capital market deepening and removal of market 
imperfections.  
 
2.1.4  Risks of both systems 
 
It is important to note that while PAYG do not have asset price risk, they have 
the political risk that future governments cannot raise taxes when 
demographic or economic changes would make it necessary to do so in order 
to finance promised benefits. In other words, PAYG system is itself very risky 
in the sense that the level of future benefits depends on the willingness of 
future voters to support the taxes required giving such benefits. In summary, 
the political risk related to PAYG implies an excessive benefit promised to 
future retires.  
 
On the other hand, the risk of a FF system is sometimes characterized as a 
problem of the riskiness of portfolio returns. As Feldstein (2005) has argued, 
this is a quite manageable problem in a prefunded system in which individuals 
invest in a broad index of stocks and bonds.  
 
It can be said that pension reform reduces overall uncertainty by decreasing 
political risk, but raises it by reducing the insurance purpose of the pension 
system. 
 
2.2   The reform 
 
There are four main issues related with pension reform: the transition, the 
effects on financial markets, the distributional effects of the shift and the 
requirements and regulations for the new scheme. In the next sub-section, a 
brief description of these issues is presented. 
 
2.2.1 The  transition 
 
Two basic features differentiate the evolution of the reform during the 
transition period: the nature of this transition and the way the transition is 
financed. 
 
There are two alternatives for the transition to be implemented: Immediate 
transition with “recognition bonds” or gradual transition. With the former, social 
security system is eliminated and employees are required to save in 
mandatory saving accounts (FF system). With the latter, (during a possibly 
  8long period), future retirees would receive a mixture of PAYG benefits and 
benefits based on the assets of FF Personal Retirement Accounts (PRAs). 
 
With respect to the financing of the transition, PAYG is by definition unfunded, 
and this implies that governments must consider the budgetary deficit or 
implicit debt once pension benefits cannot be covered by the accumulated 
payroll taxes collected. 
 
There are reform transition deficits caused by the shortfall of pre-reform 
PAYG pension contributions that are now invested in FF whilst government 
continues its PAYG commitments by paying current and future pension 
benefits to those contributors that remain affiliated with PAYG.  
 
In this sense, there are two fundamental ways how transition deficits can be 
financed: The implicit PAYG debt can be swapped for other public sector 
asset resources, for example by selling government assets (or using 
international reserves) or by issuing more debt. It can also cut expenditure or 
raise taxes for a period that lasts as long as transition deficit lasts, 
(contractionary fiscal policy). 
 
The transition implies transfers towards future generations when part of the 
transition deficit is financed by taxation. In the case of a tax-financed transition, 
the welfare effects are ambiguous. On the one hand, the transition raises 
Pareto efficiency by eliminating the pure-tax component of PAYG 
contributions. But on the other hand it reduces Pareto-efficiency by increasing 
general taxation needed to pay for a tax-financed transition of the interest 
payments on the higher explicit government, debt. 
 
However, it is more likely that the reform brings Pareto welfare gains from the 
elimination of distortions and dead weight losses in capital and labour markets. 
Even if tax revenue is used for the transition, the initial deficit would not 
decrease national saving because of the increase in private saving. 
 
The most straightforward way to finance the reform is by issuing new 
government debt. In this case, the old implicit PAYG debt is swapped for new 
explicit government debt, and the government is required to generate 
additional government revenue, to the extent that interest rate increases when 
FF substitutes explicit new debt for implicit PAYG debt. 
 
2.2.2  Effect on financial markets 
 
The substitution from a PAYG to a FF system can affect growth through the 
financial market. At least in theory there is a positive relation between 
financial development and economic growth. This effect is transmitted through 
two channels: increased savings and more efficient allocation of this savings. 
In this sense, a greater proportion of long-term capital assets are related to 
larger time horizon thus reducing the term and the equity risk premium. This 
shift to long-term assets is related to a reduction in the cost and an increase in 
the availability of equity, promoting an increase in productive capital formation. 
  9 
On the other hand, pension system reform has an important indirect effect on 
economic growth brought about by accelerating the process of financial 
development. The indirect effects of a funded system include: the promotion 
of qualitative developments on financial markets, i.e. financial innovation and 
modernization of financial infrastructures. This changes are likely to promote 
competition in the banking sector, and thus creates room for a  dynamic legal 
framework, which improves market transparency. 
 
We can also point that an additional consequence of the pension fund reform 
on capital market development is that, due to the overall development on the 
capital market, the direct costs of issuing securities are likely to be lower and 
this implies a reduction in the cost of capital. From a theoretical point of view, 
more liquid stock markets increase incentives to invest in long-duration 
projects, so that good investment projects with long duration can be 
undertaken encouraging economic growth. 
 
Finally, it is accepted that macroeconomic stability is necessary for the reform 
of the pension system to have any positive effect in the economy. On the 
other hand it is also true that the reform itself can contribute to 
macroeconomic stability not only by reducing interest rate volatility, but also 
by alleviating the political and demographic pressures of the previous system.  
 
2.2.3 Distributional  effects of the shift 
 
The transition from a PAYG to FF system requires replacing the distributive 
function implicit in the PAYG system. The main distributive element available 
to the government is the guarantee of a minimum pension to all the 
contributors to the system.  
 
In some cases of fully-funded schemes, there is a mandatory, publicly 
managed and tax-financed distributive pillar, where people receive universally 
the same benefit when retire, usually a minimum pension guarantee.  
 
In a PAYG scheme, the government can raise current workers contributions 
when current contribution levels are insufficient to finance minimum-pension 
benefits.  
 
In contrast, in a FF scheme, the government must rely on general tax revenue 
in order to pay for this program, as otherwise, the minimum pension would 
depend on the riskiness of the assets in which pension funds are invested.  
 
2.2.4  Requirements and regulations 
 
For the new system to perform efficiently, strong and effective government 
regulation is required. 
 
  10A private social security system comprises workers (required to save funds for 
retirement), pensioners, and two groups of private providers (pension fund 
management companies PFMCs and insurance companies). 
 
In this sense, international diversification of pension fund portfolios is 
desirable because it allows pensioners to improve their portfolio risks and 
returns. Investing abroad precludes pension funds from acquiring excessive 
market power in local capital markets.  
 
For instance, in Latin America, PFMCs and ICs are subject to regulations on 
minimum capital requirements and reserves. PFMCs supervision is performed 
by specialized PFMC institutions. Investment of reserves of pension annuities 
by life insurance companies are subject to portfolio regulations. 
 
  113  The Mexican case 
3.1  The old system 
 
Mexico’s public pension system was established in 1944 with the objective of 
providing coverage to private sector workers
10. This pension system was a 
PAYG scheme managed by the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) and 
thus suffered from all the problems described in the previous section. Even so 
it is important to consider the problems that affected the Mexican public 
pension system, and ultimately made the reform unavoidable. In the end the 
reasons behind the reform was the combination of a not completely adequate 
designed pension program with a the demographic trend 
 
The problem with the public pension system design was that it promised to 
pay high benefits. Under the original system a worker was eligible to receive 
benefits after just 500 weeks of contribution (about 10 years), but this benefits 
were not very sensitive to the additional years of contribution
11. As such, once 
the worker satisfied the minimum contribution period, the incentives to keep 
working vanished, thus creating important distortions in the labour market. In 
other words, once the minimum contribution time was satisfied, the worker 
had no incentives to continue contributing, as he was guaranteed a minimum 
pension equivalent to the minimum wage (indexed to the consumer price 
index since 1989). In addition to this problem, the system extended the 
medical assistance coverage to the worker’s relatives  
 
The immediate consequence of this system was the raise of the informal 
sector. The minimum salary at the time of the reform was only 60% of what 
the World Bank considers for “adequate” living standards. In this sense, once 
the minimum requirement was reached, many workers decided to drop out to 
the informal sector. 
 
Another problem with the design of the system was that its benefits were 
based on the average base wage of the last five years of contribution to the 
system divided by the minimum wage at the time of retirement. This situation 
created the incentive to retire earlier than the worker normally would if his 
salary was likely to decrease.  
 
Finally there was the issue of tax evasion. The old system was basically 
funded by means of payroll taxes with the the employer, the employee and 
the government, contributing 70-25-5 percent respectively. As such the 
                                                 
10 Public sector workers have their own pension and health care systems (ISSSTE) and a 
special fund for the workers of the petroleum company (PEMEX) among others (military and 
police forces). These systems are not part of the reform although all of them are have a 
PAYG basis. This reform is one of the “time bombs” of the Mexican economy. 
11 For instance, regardless of the number of years a person who earned one minimum wage 
contributed to the system, he would receive the same pension when retiree. Another example 
is a person who earned ten times the minimum salary, and contributed for ten years to the 
system, would get 14% of his wage replaced and 16% after thirty years of contribution. 
  12employers had an incentive to understate the wage rate of their workers to 
avoid paying the payroll tax. 
 
With respect to the demographic trend, the point can be best illustrated with 
some statistical figures. The fertility rate decreased from 6.45 children per 
woman in 1950 to 2.84 in 1995 and is expected to be 1.85 by 2027. At the 
same time, the mortality rate of people in old age has fallen. Life expectancy 
at birth has risen from 46.6 years on 1950 to 72.6 years in 1995 and is 
expected to be 81.3 years by the year 2050. An immediate consequence of 
this trend is the reduction in the number of workers per retiree. In 1950, the 
system had 67 workers per retiree, by 1994 there were only 8 workers per 
retiree and by the year 2050 it is estimated that there will be 2. In 1995, the 
IMSS projected that the rate of growth of retirees for the next 20 years of 
5.7%, while the rate of growth of the contributors was expected to be 2.6%, 
thus furthering the coverage strain. 
 
The situation presented here lead to an increase in financial problems faced 
by the government to sustain the pension scheme. In fact Government 
estimates, show that the payroll taxes on the base salary, would have to rise 
in 2020 to nearly 24%, from the actual 8.5%, in order to sustain this system. 
Estimates also show that in 1992 the the imbalance of the pension system 
was about 80% of GDP. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the lack of transparency was a problem of the 
old system almost since the beginning. Resources of the system were used to 
finance infrastructure requirements and health expenditures.  
 
3.2  The new system 
3.2.1  First attempt for a new system 
 
The first attempt to reform the old pension system was done in 1992 and was 
known as the “Retirement Savings System” or SAR
12. The system had a fully-
funded basis with individualized retirement accounts and covered for both 
private and public sector workers. The SAR-92 was designed to complement 
the existing PAYG system with a compulsory employer contribution of 2% of 
total payroll. 
 
However, this attempt was far from being sufficient. Part of the problem was 
because Mexico did not have a national identification number for each worker 
when the SAR-92 was made
13.  
 
In addition there was no entity responsible for supervising the funds. The 
funds of the retirement sub-account were used by the government as a direct 
loan, who paid a direct interest rate of no less than 2% per year over the real 
balance. With the purpose of supervising this first system, the National 
                                                 
12 SAR stands for Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro in Spanish. 
13 An example of the logistic problem that the SAR-92 implied, for a universe of 10 million 
contributors to the system, the SAR-92 created more than 40 million accounts. 




All these problems created the need of a structural reform to replace (not 
complement) the old system. In particular, a clear property rights definition 
over the workers accounts was needed.   
 
3.2.2  The structural reform 
 
In December 1995, the Congress approved the new social security law (Ley 
del Seguro Social).  A second set of laws containing the retirement savings 
system law were approved in 1996 (Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el 
Reiro). The new system began to operate on July 1, 1997. This reform has 
been considered the Ernesto Zedillo’s administration most important reform.  
 
The new pension system consists on a fully funded system with defined 
contributions. The system is mandatory for all the private sector workers and 
the funds are administrated by specialized private companies (AFORE)
15. The 
AFOREs manage the individual retirement funds known as SIEFOREs
16. The 
AFOREs charge commissions for their services and the CONSAR is the 
specialized government agency that supervises the industry.  Workers are 
allowed to choose the AFORE they want for their funds to be managed, two 
changes per year are allowed (without financial penalty) as soon as the 
chosen AFORE is cheaper in terms of commissions charged. 
 
In beginning, each AFORE was allowed to manage only one SIEFORE, and 
the number of AFORESs supervised by CONSAR was around 15. By August 
1994, there were 13 AFOREs and 32 SIEFOREs. 
 
Similar to the old system, contributions are made by employers, employees 
and government. Each month, the worker deposits a compulsory rate of 6.5% 
of his wage on his individual retirement account. The government adds to 
each worker account a “social contribution” of 5.5% of the minimum wage as 
of January 1997. In addition, the employer has to pay an additional 5% to a 
housing sub account. The design of the system states that this sub account 
will be consolidated with the AFORE account upon worker retirement.  An 
additional 4% of the wage has to be paid to a disability and survivors account 
managed by the IMSS. Additional voluntary contributions are allowed
17.  
                                                 
14 CONSAR stands for Comisión Nacional de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el Retiro. 
15 AFORE stands for Administradora de Fondos para el Retiro, which are the pension funds 
management companies. 
16 SIEFORE stands for Sociedades de Inversión Especializada en Fondos para el Reitro. 
17 A more detailed description of the composition of the funds is as follows: each individual 
account has four sub-accounts. 1. The “Retirement, severance at old age and old age” (Retiro, 
cesantía en edad avanzada y vejez) sub-account; contributions made by employers, 
employees and government are deposited here. 2. The voluntary contributions sub-account; 
without minimum or maximum limits, either the employer or the employee can make voluntary 
contributions in this sub-account. 3. Housing sub-account; employer contributions equivalent 
to 5% of wage. 4. Complementary contributions sub-account; either the employer or the 
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In contrast, the new system defines 1250 weeks (around 25 years) as the 
minimum contribution time required until retirement. The government, on the 
other hand, guarantees a pension equivalent to a minimum wage. Upon 
retirement, the worker has two options: the first is to use the money 
accumulated in his individual account to purchase a lifetime annuity from a 
private insurance company. The second option is to leave the savings in his 
individual account and make programmed withdrawals based on his life 
expectancy. If the worker has accumulated enough funds to purchase an 
annuity at least 30% higher than the minimum pension, he can opt for an early 
retirement, but in this case the worker does not qualify for the guaranteed 
minimum pension. 
 
In terms of the number of affiliated accounts, Mexico pension system ranks 
the first in Latin America, with almost 34 million accounts
18. In terms of assets 
under management, by July 1998 investment in the system was equivalent to 
4.4 USD billion, by May 2005; the investment is around 47.32 USD billions.  
 
In this sense, the reform of the Mexican’s pension system as played an 
important part in the increase of long-term domestic financial savings. 
Statistics show that they have risen to 47.3% by the end of 2004 from 31.5% 
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Regarding the portfolio composition of SIEFORES, funds are still highly 
concentrated in government bonds. By May 2005, 85% of assets under 
management were invested in Government Bonds; however the share of 
corporate bonds is rapidly increasing, and represent around 13% of the 
invested assets. It is worth noticing that a more flexible investment regime has 
been approved by the CONSAR. The most important changes imply the 
possibility of investment in local and international equities up to 20% of their 
                                                                                                                                            
employee can make contributions; this resources are only available at the moment of 
retirement.  
18 This number does not mean that there are 34 million people in the system, as each worker 
may have more  than one account,  
19 An illustrative set of graphs can be found in the Appendix 2. 
  15total portfolio
20. CONSAR specify the investment grade for the private debt to 
be eligible, in this sense, a BBB rate requirement exists since 1991. 
 








1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Government bonds Corporate bonds
Banking bonds Other instruments  
                                                  Source: Bank of Mexico 
                                                  Figures as December of each year. 
 
Some other requirements imposed by CONSAR involve the maintenance of a 
minimum capital requirement for each AFORE. Each AFORE is required to 
maintain an investment reserve which is a percentage of the total assets 
under their management. There is a formal market share limit of 20% of each 
AFORE. However, in the case that an AFORE goes bankrupt, Government 
protect worker’s savings. 
 
3.2.3 The  transition 
 
Three groups of workers are relevant in any pension reform process: the 
already retired workers, the transition workers and new workers. The first 
group in the Mexican pension reform represented around 1.6 million workers, 
and their benefits are guaranteed.  
 
The transition workers are those workers already in the labour force by 
December 31, 1996. In the case of Mexican reform there was no option for 
the transition workers to remain in the old system and no “recognition bonds” 
were available. All transition workers were encouraged to choose an AFORE 
and transfer to the new system by 2001
21. However, a “life-switch” option was 
available, which implied that when the worker reaches the retirement 
requirements, he can choose the system with the highest level of benefits
22.  
                                                 
20  Permitted debt securities must be issued by Governments, Central Banks and 
governmental agencies of countries members of the Technical Committee of the IOSCO or 
the European Union, Corporations, as long as the securities are issued in a market under the 
regulation of any country member of the Technical Committee of the IOSCO or the European 
Union, and Multilateral financial entibies (i.e. IDB or The World Bank, etc). 
 
21 The resources of workers who have not transferred to an AFORE were deposited in a 
special account at Bank of Mexico and the Government assigned an AFORE for them. 
22 In the case the worker chooses the old system, he will receive his full IMSS benefit plus 
accumulated SAR balances only up to December 1996 plus returns. 
  16The “life-switch” option has been criticized as it can create a moral hazard 
problem: riskier investment strategies can be can be pursued by workers as 
they can always fall back to the benefits of the precious system.  
 
All the new workers (those who join the labour force since 1997), are 
automatically in the new system and have to choose an AFORE. 
 
4 Empirical  analysis 
 
In this section we analyse the implications for economic growth and financial 
markets of the movement from a PAYG to a fully funded pension system. With 
that in mind we begin by presenting some previous empirical evidence of the 
impact of pension fund assets on economic growth. We then proceed to 
describe the methodology and the data used, and to end this section we 
present several estimation results.  
 
4.1  Previous empirical analysis 
 
In the next sub-section, results of previous empirical analysis related to the 
direct and indirect effect of the reform on economic growth are presented. 
This section does not pretend to be an exhaustive account of the existing 
empirical literature; but pretends to explore some of the most recent and 
better documented works on the empirical analysis. 
 
4.1.1  Financial development and economic growth 
 
King and Levine (1993) estimate a cross-country regression for 80 countries 
over a period of 39 years and found evidence that is consistent with 
Schumpeter’s view that the financial system can promote economic growth
23. 
Their study consists on analysing the empirical relationship between four 
financial indicators and four growth indicators.  
 
The four financial indicators are the ratio of the size of the formal financial 
intermediary sector to GDP, the importance of banks relative to the central 
bank, the percentage of credit allocated to private firms and the ratio of credit 
issued to private firms as a percentage of GDP. 
 
On the other hand, the measures of economic activity include: the rate of 
physical capital accumulation measured as an estimate of the per-capita 
growth rate, and improvements in the efficiency with which economies employ 
physical capital. In addition of the previous variables, King and Levine 
included the ratio of trade (exports and imports) to GDP, the ratio of 
                                                 
23 The authors conduct two analyses: a pure cross-country analysis using data averaged over 
the 1960-1989 period and a pooled cross country time series study using data averaged over  
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 
  17government spending to GDP and the average inflation rate to control for 
other phenomena. 
 
For the sample of countries being considered, they conclude that measures of 
financial development are associated with the measures of economic activity. 
In particular, they find that higher levels of financial development are positively 
associated with faster rates of economic growth, physical capital accumulation 
and economic efficiency improvements. In addition, they show that there is a 
positive relationship between the level of financial development and future 
rates of long-run growth of physical capital accumulation and economic 
efficiency improvements. 
 
For the case of Chile, Holzman (1997) showed econometrically that the 
development of financial markets in Chile correlates with strong development 
of the real side of the economy via rising TFP and capital accumulation. His 
estimations imply that long term growth in Chile is 1-3% higher owing to the 
effects of the pension reform operating via financial markets. 
   
Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) study the relation between financial 
intermediation and the sources of economic growth. Among the sources of 
growth the authors analyse the following: private saving rates, capital 
accumulation, TFP growth and overall real per-capita productivity growth. The 
primary measure of financial intermediary development they employ is private 
credit. In order to asses the robustness of their results, Beck, Levine and 
Loayza use two additional measures of financial development: liquid liabilities 
as percentage of GDP and commercial bank domestic assets divided by 
commercial bank plus central bank domestic assets. An interesting variable 
that the authors include is the legal origin of each country in their sample, 
where they include a dummy variable for British, French, German and 
Scandinavian legal origin. They think the thesis that cross-country differences 
in legal origin help explain differences in financial development.  
 
They find evidence that financial intermediaries exert a positive impact on 
total factor productivity growth and real per capita GDP growth. However, the 
evidence of a long run relationships between financial intermediary 
development and both physical capital growth and private savings rates is 
weaker.  
 
4.1.2  Pension fund assets and financial development 
 
Walker and Lefort (2000) use a panel data approach to analyse a sample of 
33 emerging economies and a sub sample of 7 Latin American countries. 
They argue that one of the most important effects of the pension system 
reform on economic activity is the improvement in the allocation of funds for 
investment proposes, which should translate into a better resource allocation. 
This better allocation of resources could have permanent positive effects on 
growth and welfare as long as investment in private securities is allowed. 
  
  18They test the hypothesis that pension fund reform reduces firm cost of capital 
and stock market volatility. As a proxy of the firms cost of capital they use 
dividend yields and price to book ratios, and the per capital income as a 
general measure of the development of the country, the annual inflation rate 
and the assets of deposit money banks to GDP as a measure of the 
development of capital markets. The authors use total assets of pension funds, 
a measure of the investment in stock by pension funds and the relative 
importance of investment in stock and private bonds on the total market. The 
empirical evidence is in the sense that pension fund investment in stocks is 
associated with required responsiveness to external shocks and also price-to 
book ratios tend to be positively associated with it. 
  
Specifically, the evidence for Chile shows several direct and indirect effects 
that the reform has had on the creation (or implementation) of new financial 
instruments. They also find evidence in the sense that transition costs tend to 
decrease as a side effect of the pension system reform and asset 
accumulation. Pension fund importance decreases the average dividend yield 
and increases private to book ratios of firms. They find evidence that dividend 
yields are lower after the reform, and in the case of Chile, transaction costs 
decreased as a side effect of the pension reform and asset accumulation.  
 
Granville and Mallick (2002) investigate the link between capital markets 
reform and savings, with particular focus on the case of the pension system 
reform in the UK with annual data form 1978 to 2000. With this aim in mind 
the authors implement an analysis with the following variables: aggregate 
savings rate, credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP to indicate 
the liquidity constraint on households, ratio of the net investment by private 
pension funds over the working-age population, real interest rate, real 
expenditure on public pension benefits divided by the population over 60 
years, the dependency ratio, government fiscal balance and per capita growth. 
 
They find that higher pension assets are associated with a net increase in 
national savings. However, as the authors note, the results should be treated 
with caution because the relatively short sample size. 
  
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) measure the effect of Chilean pension 
system reform on financial development from 1960 to 2001. In order to 
measure this development, the authors consider a variable called financial 
intermediation ratio which represents the main financial assets in the 
economy as % of GDP; as explanatory variables they consider a financial 
liberalization index, pension fund assets, a dummy variable for critical levels 
of inflation, interest rate, inflation rate and a measure of the deviation of the 
real exchange rate with respect of its tendency. 
 
The authors find a long run relationship between financial development and 
control variables and pension fund variables. 
 
Davis and Hu (2004) investigate the direct link between pension assets and 
economic growth, using a variety of methods. In particular, their analysis 
  19considers the following variables: output per worker, pension fund assets as 
percentage of GDP, capital per worker and they study a set of countries.  
 
They find that pension assets as percentage of GDP is positively and 
significantly affect output in a variety of economic specifications, and with a 
larger effect for EMEs than OECD countries. Their results imply that pension 
assets growth boost both capital and output during the initial few years before 
following a gradual decline. 
 
Hu (2005) uses a dataset covering 59 countries, including both OCED 
countries as well as emerging market economies.  Hu examines a variety of 
estimations considering both the effect of pension reform and economic 
growth as well as the indirect effect through the financial development
24. 
 
He finds a positive and statistically significant link between pension fund and 
economic growth, in the long run and a negative relationship in the short run. 
The economic growth variables considered are total factor productivity growth 
rate, gross physical capital formation as a percentage of GDP and private 
saving rate, gross domestic saving as percentage of GDP, and gross national 
saving as percentage of GDP. Hu also finds a strong positive link between 
pensions and the TFP growth rate, the gross fixed capital formation growth 
rate and GDP growth rate.  
 
Finally, Hu analyzes the relationship between pension fund assets and 
financial development. He finds a positive short run effect from pensions to 
private credit provided by banks and other financial institutions, while the long 
run relationship is not significant. The author also finds econometric evidence 
in the sense that pension funds growth leads to less credit provided by 
commercial banks in the economy both in the short and in the long run.  
 
By looking at the stock market, he finds a strong positive link between pension 
fund assets and three stock market indicators: market capitalization, market 
value traded and market turnover. In all three indicators, there is a strong 
effect both in the short run and in the long run. 
 
In the next section we follow Hu (2005) and Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) 
papers, to perform an econometric analysis of the Mexican pension system 
reform. We begin by analysing the presence of cointegrating relationships 
among variables, by using the Engle and Granger two steps methodology. 
The next section presents a brief description of this methodology. 
 
4.2  Engle and Granger two steps methodology.   
 
In this procedure, given a set of non-stationary variables, the existence of a 
common trend is tested. The two steps are as follows: 
 
                                                 
24The variables used in the present analysis were chosen basically following Hu (2005)  
  20Step 1: Begin by Regressing one variable against the other(s) of the same 
order to obtain an estimate of the cointegrating vector. If the variables are 
cointegrated, OLS estimators provide consistent coefficients
25. 
 
t t x y 1 0 β β + =     ( 1 )  
 
Step 2: There are two possibilities to analyse the presence of cointegration 
relationship between the variables, i) test for cointegration on the residuals of 
(1) or ii) test for significance on the Error Correction Model (ECM). 
 
The first possibility is known as the residuals-based approach. It consist on 
testing the residual  t t t x y z 1 0 β β − − =   for stationarity and if  is stationary, 
conclude in favour of cointegration. The test 
t z
t t t z z υ ρ + = −1  with  t υ  white noise 
is equivalent to  t t t z a z ε + = Δ −1 1  with the null hypothesis . 0 : 1 0 = a H .  
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I(0)  I(0)    Both series are stationary. The classical regression model is 
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first differences is appropriate. 
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adjustment to the long-run. 
      
S = stationary, NS =  non-stationary 
 
It has to be noted that since   is generated from a regression equation, the 
true values of   are unknown and the distribution of the test statistic under 
Ho ( ) is affected by the number of regressors included in (1). There are 
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25 The generated estimators are consistent in the sense that as T→∞, the estimation of 
∧
 
converges to the “real” β and any deviation in finite samples converges to 0 as T→∞. Stock 
(1987) showed that these estimators converge master than the same estimators if both series 
were be I(0). 
β
26  Granger’s representation theorem. 
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From this estimation, the significance level of the EC Element (et-1) has to be 
tested. If it is statistically significant, conclude in favour of cointegration. 
27
 
It is worth noting that as in the econometric estimations that evidence of no 
cointegration was found, although the appropriate strategy would be to 
employ specifications in first differences, these models are not presented here 
as these models have no long-run equilibrium solution. 
 
For the estimations we use the general-to-specific approach proposed by 
Hendry. This approach consists of starting with a broad model that is reduced 
as the coefficients are insignificant in a successive bias, thus ensuring the 
model specification follows the parsimony principle.  
                                                 
27 The ECM with two variables has associated the following model as well: 
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i t i t z t z y e z ε α α α α y  and  αz  are both statistically different 
from zero, a VAR is estimated. In the present empirical work, this was not the case, so that 
only (2) was estimated. 
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4.3 Estimation  results. 
 
4.3.1 The  Data 
 
The next table contains the variables used for the empirical analysis. The set 
of graphs used for the estimations and the source of each variable can be 
consulted in the Appendix A. 
 
    
Table 2 
    
Description of the variables 
  
  
AFI   M3a = M2a + financial assets held by non-residents - currency outside banks. 
PFAR
*_/ Pension fund assets. 
FINLIB  Financial liberalization (number of financial law reforms in each year) 
CT28  Short term Mexican interest rate 
3MTB  3-Month treasury bill 
PPCCPR  Short run private real interest rate 
INF Inflation  Rate 
GPRER  Real exchange rate gap, constructed as the difference of RER and a 
Holdrick-Prescot filtered RER 
OPEN  Openness defined as exports plus imports as % of GDP 
IVPFI  Production index  
PFAGDP  Pension fund assets as % of GDP 
BYMGDP  Currency in circulation as % of GDP 
FBCGDP  Domestic financing by commercial banks as % of GDP 
IPC  Mexican stock market index 
TOR  Stock market turnover 
GPGDP  Government expenditure as % of GDP 
CIBRAFI  Deposits in resident banks as % of total financial savings 
AFIGDP  Financial savings as % of GDP 
VMVGDP  Stock market capitalization as % of GDP 
OMBGDP  Stock market value traded as % of GDP 
VPUPRAFI  Public securities held by residents as % of financial savings 
VPRPRAFI  Private sector securities held by residents as % of financial savings 
IGAE  Global Index of Economic Activity 
  
*_/ It is worth noting that in the following sections, pension fund assets comprises only privatized pension fund 
assets (IMSS assets), excluding non-reformed pension fund assets. 
 
Additionally, three dummy variables were considered: 
 
DINF is a dummy variable that accounts for outstanding values for inflation 
rate. This variable takes values of 1 for annual inflation rates above one 
standard deviation from the mean of the period
28. DPEN is a dummy variable 
that takes values of 1 after the implementation of the new pension system 
reform in 1997. Finally, D04 when the financial liberalization reform variable is 
not explicitly considered. This variable accounts for the important changes in 
the Siefores investment regime during 2004. 
 
                                                 
28 Above and below the one standard deviation line on the inflation graph. This period covers 
from April 1996 to March 1997.  
  23The first step for the estimation is to test the order of integration of the 
variables. From the ADF test, with trend and intercepts, it can be concluded 
that the only three variables that are stationary are PPCCPR, TOR and 
GPGDP. For all the other variables, the null hypothesis of existence of a unit 
root in the series can not be rejected. 
 
The next table presents the results of unit root test obtained using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. 
 
          
Table 3 
          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test of Stationarity 
          













              
FIRR2 -0.992  1.084    -5.023  -4.805    I(1) 
PFAR -1.268  3.126    -5.207  -2.946    I(1) 
FINLIB -2.176  -2.027    -5.479  -5.477    I(1) 
CT28 -2.873  -2.592    -8.076  -8.097    I(1) 
3MTB -2.094  -1.657    -3.63  -3.636    I(1) 
PPCCPR -4.563  -3.172    -6.703  -6.734    I(0) 
INF -2.530  -2.065    -3.643  -3.658    I(1) 
GPRER -3.488  -3.493    -6.951  -6.975    I(1) 
OPEN -1.573  -1.939    -6.522  -6.145    I(1) 
IVPFI -2.605  -0.884    -6.889  -6.92    I(1) 
PFAGDP -1.790  1.983    -8.124  -7.372    I(1) 
BYMGDP -0.679  0.302    -6.802  -6.683    I(1) 
FBCGDP -3.170  -0.488    -7.126  -6.017    I(1) 
IPC -0.711  1.414    -7.118  -6.778    I(1) 
TOR -5.297  -4.626    -8.989  -9.000    I(0) 
GPGDP -4.438  -1.497    -9.964  -9.993    I(0) 
CIBRAFI -2.003  0.41    -5.674  -5.295    I(1) 
AFIGDP -3.107  -0.479    -10.68  -10.715    I(1) 
VMVGDP -2.731  -2.162    -6.913  -6.802    I(1) 
OMBGDP -3.946  -3.237    -8.103  -8.118    I(1) 
VPUPRAFI -3.333  -0.52    -4.892  -4.166    I(1) 
VPRPRAFI -1.422  -1.461    -5.158  -5.163    I(1) 
IGAE -2.599  -0.282    -5.419  -5.424    I(1) 
               
Note: ADF unit root test is based on four lags; critical values are: 1% = -4.012,  
5% = -3.436 and 10% = -3.142. 
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4.3.2 The  effect  on  economic indicator 
 
Once the order of integration of the variables has been tested, the following 
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The result of the first step of the Engle – Granger methodology which is the 
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Adj. R2  0.924
S.E. of reg.  0.036
DW stat.  0.879
F-statistic 309.822
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
The residuals of this estimation were analyzed and the null hypothesis of the 
existence of a unit root was rejected favouring the alternative of no unit root, it 
can be said that the residuals are stationary
29. 
 
                                                 
29 The unit root test on these and all the other residuals are available upon request.  
  25The ECM explains around 71% of the production index variation. Durbin-
Watson statistic shows that there are not first order autocorrelation in the 
residuals.  
 
It can be seen that the coefficient of the Error Correction element is 
statistically significant and –1<ECM<0 as expected
30 .
  This element is a 
measure of the speed of adjustment that is 0.27 in this case. This means that 
in each period, the production index will adjust to its growth rate in an amount 
equivalent to at almost one third of deviation of the last period with respect to 
long-run level. 
 
From this estimation, it is revealed that pension assets have been positively 
and significantly linked to growth. This is consistent with previous empirical 
literature results and is particularly consistent with Hu (2005) results in the 
sense that pension growth induces higher productivity in emerging markets. In 
the short run a detrimental effect of contemporaneous inflation can be seen.  
There is also evidence that higher interest rate dampens IVFPI. In terms of 
credit, there is a negative sign associated with the impact regressor that is 
compensated with positive effects in the next periods. The negative sign 
although intriguing was also found by Davis and Hu (2004) who argues that 
large banking lending might contribute to macro economic volatility, for 
example via commercial property cycles, consequently, economic growth is 
affected negatively. It is worth noting that although a variable of government 
expenditure was included in the short run estimation, it was not statistically 
significant.  
 
4.3.3  The effect on financial development 
 
The effect of pension fund assets on financial development can be analyzed 
trough four aspects, financial intermediaries, the banking industry, the stock 
market and the bond markets. Financial intermediaries are proxied by 
considering financial savings as percentage of GDP and financial savings in 
real terms as the dependent variable
31.  
 
The general formulation of the following estimations is: 
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30 This condition is necessary for the model to be stable, the short run regressions of this and 
the other estimations can be consulted in the Appendix B.  
31 This second estimation was made based on Corbo-Schmidt Hebbel (2003) estimation. 
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Where K is a vector of dependent variables including the following: AFIGDP, 
FBCGDP, VMVGDP,  VPUPRAFI and VPRPRAFI.  ECM is an error correction 




          
Table 4 
Pension fund assets and financial indicators 
Long run relation 
          
 LAFIGDP  LFBCGDP  LVMVGDP LVPUPRAFI LVPRPRAFI 
          
C 4.244  11.193 2.965 9.185  0.162
 (10.989)  (9.390) (3.309) (19.341)  (0.518)
LPFAGDP 0.177  -0.206 -0.454 0.122  -0.215
 (16.837)  (-5.317) (-15.491) (4.204)  (-11.601)
LBYMGDP       -1.259  1.794
       (-6.639)  (14.810)
LFBCGDP       -1.473  -0.167
      (-19.272)  (-2.753)
LOPEN      -0.282   
       (-3.044)   
DCRISIS -0.087  0.145   0.178  -0.072
 (-6.332)  (3.396)  (3.990)  (-2.095)
DPEN 0.086  0.190 -0.066   -0.112
 (-6.011)  (4.332) (-1.869)   (-2.658)
LIGAE -0.143  -1.532 -1.069   
 (-1.739)  (-5.845) (-5.149)    
LIPC   -0.107 0.664    
   (-1.803) (12.556)    
LTOR   0.059 0.103    
   (2.038) (4.003)    
R2 0.927  0.917 0.883 0.962  0.872
Adj. R2  0.925  0.914 0.878 0.960  0.868
S.E. of reg.  0.038  0.116 0.104 0.125  0.098
DW stat  0.566  0.396 0.450 0.658  0.698
F-statistic 449.3  259.8 211.9 738.8  201.5
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
With respect to the financial intermediation, a positive sign related to the 
financial pension assets and financial savings was found. The magnitude of 
this relation implies that 10% increase in pension fund assets is related to 
almost 2% increase in financial savings. This effect is corroborated with the 
positive sign of the dummy variable DPEN. 
 
The ADF test applied to the residual series from this long-run regression 
proves the existence of a cointegration relation between the variables in the 
long run. The error correction model illustrates that the lagged residual has a 
significant and negative sign, with a coefficient of 0.05, which indicates that 
  27financial savings auto-corrects towards its long-run equilibrium slowly. In the 
short run, an overall positive effect was found related to pension fund assets 
and AFI. 
 
As was stated above, a second estimation with the financial intermediation 
measure as the dependent variable was conducted. Following Corbo - 
Schmidt Hebbel (2003), we estimate a cointegration vector to measure 
financial development that includes a variable to account for the importance of 
the pension funds for the system created with the 1997 reform. In this system 
two types of variables were included: a structural reform variable which takes 
into account financial liberalization process and variables that in simple 
models are important for the relative demands of the different financial assets.  
 
In this estimation, AFI measures the level of financial depth and is the sum of 
the main financial assets in the economy




Alternative estimation of 


















Adj. R2   0.983
S.E. of reg.   0.029
DW stat  0.853
F-statistic  1396.9
Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000
t-statistics in parenthesis 
 
The variable accounting for the pension reform is the pension fund assets 
variable in real terms (AFI). Corroborating the previous result, a positive 
relation of the amount of resources in the pension system and the financial 
savings was found. A positive effect was found of the variables related to the 
                                                 
32 According to Bank of Mexico monetary aggregates, M3a is M2a plus domestic financial 
assets held by non-residents. M2a comprises currency outside banks, domestic currency 
checking accounts in resident banks, foreign currency checking accounts in resident banks, 
current account deposits in resident banks, domestic financial assets held by residents, and 
domestic financial assets held by non-residents. 
  28pension reform dates and the important changes in the legislation in 1997 and 
2004, respectively.  The structural reform variable was constructed with the 
aim of measure the financial liberalization process during the last years. For 
the construction of this variable, the number of financial law reforms for each 
year was taken into account with special attention being paid, to the financial 
reforms related to the pension system
33. 
 
As for the banking industry, the ratio of domestic credit provided by banking 
industry to GDP (FBCGDP) was considered. The inclusion of this variable is 
with the aim of measure whether with pension fund assets’ growth, the 
traditional commercial banking industry has declined its relevance compared 
to other financial institutions. 
 
As it can be seen from Table 4, the coefficient of LPFAGDP on credit 
(LFBCGDP) is negative, implying that domestic credit provided by banking 
sector across the sample is declining in the long run while in the short run the 
effect is mixed. The negative effect founded reflects the declining tendency on 
the credit provided from commercial banks to the private sector in the lasts 




The coefficient of DLPFAGDP is 0.72 in the short run (impact), positive and 
significant, suggesting that pensions induce financial development by 
facilitating saving transfer. However, as was previously said, the long run 
effect is negative. We also found a negative (but weakly significant) effect of 
stock market on the dependent variable while the coefficient of the stock 
market turnover is positive and significant. 
 
In this estimation, a positive relationship of stock market development on 
credit lending by banks in the long run. This effect supports the idea of 
financial accelerator hypothesis which is especially observable for emerging 
markets where the higher net wealth of individuals leads to more banking 
lending which in turn stimulates economic growth.  
 
The residual of this regression are stationary, implying the existence of a long 
run relationship among the variables. The variable related to the error 
correction mechanism is negative and statistically significant and for its 
magnitude (0.039) can be said that the adjustment process of the dependent 
variable process after a shock is slow.  
 
Results of pension fund assets’ impact on stock market are given in the same 
table (Table 4). Stock market capitalization (LVMVGDP) is the most frequently 
used variable, and measure the overall size of markets. A significant – but 
                                                 
33 As was discussed in section 3.2.2, during 2004 important changes to Siefores’ investment 
regime were approved.  
34 Non-bank lending represents a bigger amount of resources to the private sector. The 
sources for the non-bank lending are financial institutions such as (SOFOLES), credit unions, 
leasing and factoring enterprises. It also includes non bank liabilities of companies listed in 
the Mexican Stock Exchange Market and other securities and credit card of others non-bank 
lending and department stores 
  29negative – effect related to the pension fund asset was found for the long run. 
A possible explanation of this result is the small sample size for which pension 
fund assets can be invested in equities due to past regulation. However, the 
effect in the short run is positive and important in magnitude. 
 
As indicated by the sign of coefficient of lagged inflation, there is sign of the 
negative impact of macro-instability on stock market capitalization. In the 
same sense, interest rate shows negative sign, implying the opposite 
movement of interest rate and stock market. These results are in line with Hu 
(2005) estimation for a group of emerging markets economies. 
 
Finally, we consider returns on bonds, as for pensions’ impact on the public 
bond market (VPUPRAFI), the results presented in Table 4 are in favour of a 
positive relationship with pension fund assets both in the long run and in the 
short run. This positive sign can be related to the willingness of government to 
use pension funds to finance implicit pension debts and although less 
important proportion of pension funds is invested in government bonds, the 
amount is still important
35.  Concerning other explanatory variables, there are 
negative effects of inflation on public bond markets implying the importance of 
macro-stability in maintaining financial markets. Compared with other financial 
development indicators, the speed of adjustment of the public bonds to its 
long run equilibrium is fast, and  indicates that the dependent variable auto-
corrects by approximately 2/10 each period. 
 
Regarding the private bond market (VPRPRAFI) the estimation in levels 
shows a negative sign related to the pension system assets in the long run, 
however in the short run the relation is positive and statistically significant. 
This result is consistent with the expectation of a more developed private 
bond market following a pension asset growth.  
                                                 
35 The details with respect of the composition of the funds invested by SIEFORES are in the 
section 3.2.2 of this paper. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
Global life expectancy at birth is estimated to have risen from 47 years in 
1950-1955 to 65 years in 2000-2005, and is estimated to keep increasing to 
reach 75 years by 2050. This population aging will occur faster in developing 
countries. On the other hand, the proportion of the population in working age 
is expected to decline in the future. These combined processes imply 
important policy challenges related to social institutions from labour and 
capital markets to health and pension systems. 
 
In the case of pension systems, the challenge have implied in many countries 
around the globe the structural reform, form unfunded PAYG to funded FF 
schemes.  In this context, Latin America is the region with the largest number 
of countries with reformed pension system in the world. 
 
In the case of Mexico, the aging process of the population is also very 
important: while in 1990 life expectancy at birth was 71 years, it has increase 
to 74 years in 2005 and is expected to be 81 by the year 2050. In that year, 
the population with 60 or more years will represent almost 28% of total 
population, in contrast to the today’s 7.7%.  
 
The structural reform in the Mexcian poension system began in 1997, when 
the old defined benefit program began to be subsituted for a defined 
contribution fully funded scheme. The new system is mandatory for all the 
private sector workers and the funds are administed by specialized private 
companies. 
 
It has been argued that a pension reform can have an important effect on 
financial market development as long as pension fund assets can be invested 
in a variety of assets, because the reform imporves the performance of the 
functions of financial market development and can improve the functions of 
the financial markets. In this sense, funding may increase portfolio investment, 
reducing the volatility of returns. 
 
The aim of this paper was to investigate the implications for the Mexican 
financial system of the structural reform of the pension system that began in 
1997.  
 
On the other hand it has been analized in the empirical literature the positive 
link between financial markets development and economic growht. This result 
is supported by the idea that better functioning financial intermediaries 
improve resource allocation and accelerate total factor productivity growth 
with positive reprecusions for long-run economic growht. Taking into account 
these results, the structural reform on the pension system in Mexico could 
lead to both direct and indirect positive effects overall macroeconomic 
performance.  
 
  31We employed a cointegration technique to explore in the light the existence 
and significance of a long-run relationship among pension fund assets and 
financial development indicators. From a variety of estimations, pension 
reform as a percentage of GDP were found to positiveley and significantly 
affect financial development. 
 
In particular, the effect of pension fund assets on financial development was 
analized trough four aspects: finanical intermediaries, represented by financial 
savings as a percentage of GDP as the dependent variable, the banking 
industry, represented by domestic financing by commercial banks as % of 
GDP, the stock market measured by stock market capitalization as % of GDP 
and bond market, measured by both public and private securities held by 
residents as % of financial savings.  
 
We found that higher pension assets are associated in the long-run with 
financial savings, which is consitent with the fact that pension fund may act as 
a institutional investors managing the increased personal savings. With 
respect to the banking industry, a negative long-run relationship was found. 
This negative sign can be explained by the declining trend on the credit 
provided from commercial banks to the private sector and the rise in 
importance of other financial intermediaries.  
 
Results of pension fund assets on stock market capitalization is significant but 
negative. A possible explanation of this result is the small sample size for 
which pension fund assets can be invested in equities due to past regulation. 
This same explanation can be valid in order to explain the negative sing 
founded for the long-run relationship between pension fund assets and private 
sector securities held by residents. 
 
The analysis conducted here was intended to be a approximation to the effect 
of the relativleley recent pension system structural reform in Mexico.  As was 
described in section 3.2, the regulation on the new system has been 
continuously improving in several areas: allowing investment in forgein 
instruments, introducing measures to improve market competition, 
strengthening the investment risk framework, etc. Due to the relativeley small 
number of obervations and these changes in regulation, there can be 
economic implications that this investigation could have been misscaptured. 
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*-/ The “L” before each variable name implies that the data are on logaritmic scale. 
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Short run relationships 
 
Short run regression of the relationship between pension fund assets and 
economic indicator is presented in the next Table. 
 
       
Table 3.A 
 
Pension fund assets and economic indicator 
Short run relation 
Based on Hu (2005) 
  Based on Corbo and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2003) 
        
 DLIVFPI      DLAFI 
C 0.001  C  0.004
 (0.648)    (3.960)
DLY(-1) -0.453  DLY(-3)  0.250
 (-6.302)    (3.479)
DLPFAGDP(-3) -0.045  DPRER(-1)  -0.015
 (-1.561)    (-2.474)
DLFBCGDP -0.243  DPRER(-3)  -0.040
 (-4.240)    (-5.211)
DLFBCGDP(-3) 0.176  DLCT28  -0.014
 (2.667)    (-2.016)
DLFBCGDP(-4) 0.163  DLCT28(-3)  0.019
 (2.882)    (2.108)
DLOPEN 0.280  DLCT28(-4)  -0.022
 (10.372)    (-3.317)
DLOPEN(-1) 0.194  DLINF  -0.045
 (5.997)    (-3.031)
DLINF -0.095  DTB3M  0.009
 (-3.328)    (1.711)
DLCT28 -0.034  DINF  -0.005
 (-2.294)    (-1.697)
DLCT28(-1) -0.039  ECM(-1)  -0.071
 (-2.554)    (-2.109)
DLCT28(-3) -0.037   
 (-2.779)   
ECM(-1) -0.270   
 (-4.627)   
R2 0.710  R2  0.535
Adj. R2  0.685  Adj. R2  0.501
S.E. of reg.  0.070  S.E. of reg.  0.016
DW stat  1.621  DW stat  1.992
F-statistic 27.811  F-statistic  15.551
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
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Table 4.A 





       
DLFBCGDP  DLVMVGDP  DLVPUPRAFI  DLVPRPRAFI 
C -0.005  -0.015  -0.012  0.011  -0.004 
 (-3.240)  (-7.404)  (-4.676) (1.627)  (-1.032) 
DLY(-1)         
          
DLY(-2)    0.252     
     (3.857)     
DLY(-3)    0.144    0.094 
     (2.750)    (1.303) 
DLY(-4)      0.209 0.194 
       (3.030)  (2.703) 
DLPFAGDP 0.700  0.721 0.699  -0.196   
 (23.413)  (18.953)  (14.167) (-1.908)   
DLPFAGDP(-1)       0.210   
       (1.913)   
DLPFAGDP(-2) -0.224  -0.224  -0.495    0.261 
 (-8.149)  (-5.700)  (-8.494)    (3.269) 
DLPFAGDP(-3)       -0.184   
       (-2.491)   
DLPFAGDP(-4) -0.123  -0.111      -0.126 
 (-4.822)  (-3.099)      (-2.259) 
DLIGAE -0.091    -0.285     
 (-2.574)    (-4.329)     
DLIGAE(-4)   0.102  0.718     
   (2.092)  (32.539)     
DLIPC(-2)     -0.139     
     (-2.610)     
DLIPC(-3)     -0.093     
     (-2.096)     
DLFBCGDP          
          
DLFBCGDP(-3)          
          
DLFBCGDP(-4)          
          
DLOPEN          
          
DLOPEN(-1)          
          
DLINF          
          
DLINF(-1)     -0.061     
     (-2.572)     
DLINF(-4)       -0.148   
       (2.349)   
DLCT28   0.052  -0.042 -0.177 -0.066 
    (4.644)  (-3.405) (-5.092) (-2.596) 
DLCT28(-1)  -0.014     -0.065  
  (-1.745)     (-1.887)  
DLCT28(-3) -0.033  -0.045       
 (-4.030)  (-4.035)       
DLCT28(-4)     0.033     
     (2.690)     
DLTOR(-3)         -0.024 
         (-2.523) 
DLTOR(-4)         -0.016 
         (-1.685) 
ECM(-1)  -0.055  -0.039  -0.022 -0.209 -0.163 
 (-1.639)  (-2.484)  (-1.238) (-4.590) (-4.095) 
R2 0.849  0.752  0.935 0.389 0.259 
Adj. R2  0.841  0.739  0.930 0.354 0.217 
S.E. of reg.  0.028  0.020  0.057 0.504 0.294 
DW stat  2.022  2.017  1.938 2.073 1.974 
F-statistic 110.947  58.776 160.693  11.210  6.152 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
t-statistic in parenthesis  
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